

NATIONALISM, ALIENATION & THE CRISIS OF IDEOLOGY

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I want in this paper to examine a cluster of problems central to the consciousness of our time.

First, let me elaborate upon the problems I want to discuss - nationalism, alienation and the crisis of ideology. (Note 1) There is in Africa a growing 'nationalism' of a narrow, often separatist kind. This problem really existed prior to the imperial-colonial era and is resurfacing now with great urgency. Mere assertions of the need for Pan-Africanism have, not unexpectedly, met with little response, for this new nationalism is now based upon the economic realities of the malformed economies that are the product of outward directed growth. (Note 2) The unequal development of different regions greatly fuels potential animosities.

Alienation can be seen as a *central* social problem diffusing widely through society. We first had the *alienated* intellectual unable to 'return' to his people, having been educated abroad. He has now disappeared with the rest of the refuse of the '60's. The alienation of to-day is however a more crucial problem. Gifted and imaginative people are becoming alienated from a society that is motivated more and more by crude self interest and a shallow materialism. Their vision of what it is for them to be human and for society to be humane so that life in it can be *fulfilling* is confronted with the real structure and crudities of their societies. Crudities which are intrinsic to any free-market society motivated purely by profit.

Peasant farmers are alienated from the bureaucratic structure which they see as a vampire sucking its life out of them. In some African countries the bureaucracies consume 60 per cent of the national product, and since peasant farmers contribute the overwhelming proportion of this the vampire image is not far-fetched. Peasant farmers do not see the bureaucratic structure as acting in *their* interests, (the story is told of some naive cocoa farmers who thought that Cocoa House, Ibadan. (Nigeria) had something to do with them!) and so their economic alienation is coupled with a political alienation.

I must make clear what I mean by "the crisis of ideology." Soyinka has often spoken of 'the crisis of ideology.' There are at least two things that can be meant by this phrase.

- (a) the absence of ideology
- (b) a critical stage in an ideological development

Soyinka means the former and in this he is mistaken. There is no absence of ideology in Africa, nor is there an absence of an intellectual tradition in Africa as some rashly maintain (Note 3) What there is an absence of is an acquaintance with this intellectual tradition. How many Africans do you know who could competently discuss the views of the following: Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Mill and Marx? Very many. Now, how many could discuss the views of Wilmot Blyden, Frederick Douglass, 'Africanus' Horton,

Booker T. Washington, Marcus Garvey, DuBois, Padmore, Cesaire and Cabral? Very very few. It is only this fact which gives rise to the phenomena mistakenly characterized as 'absence of ideology,' for the above names represent a very profound line of intellectual development, whose internal logic is extremely intricate and richly variegated.

What I mean by the *crisis of ideology* is then the critical stage of intellectual development reached to-day. This is due to the changing *problematic* of African development and politics. Prior to independence the major problematic was national liberation and all politically active people addressed themselves to that. After Independence there was a complex and fluid situation where so many things seemed probable, and too much was to be gained by optimism for a serious consideration of the structural situation to be given. Characteristically the problem was then seen as being that of 'corrupt individuals,' neglecting the fact that by and large corrupt systems *produce* corrupt leaders (Note 4). To-day in the seventies structural analysis is coming to be recognized as essential. It is just at this stage when we confront the whole society in terms of structures and institutions that the whole tradition that motivated many intellectuals falls apart. I speak here of the decomposition and disintegration of socialism. Confronted with the specificities of African society we claimed to have modified socialism, but now with greater acquaintance with the structure of African society we can see that socialism cannot be Africanized because it is built *upon* racist, Eurocentric foundations. Capitalist forms of development can be shown to be totally impossible for Africa apart from the independent objections to our striving to produce a society as thoroughly corrupt, as racially and socially divisive and as culturally bankrupt as western capitalist societies. Apparently, neither western socialism nor western capitalism are appropriate to Africa: thus the crisis.

I have outlined above the issues which I wish to confront and for which I shall present solutions or contributions to solutions.

My argument basically involves a simple conclusion and a complex articulation. The simple conclusion is that western theories as to how to solve our problems *reinforce* them and make them much worse. (I do not speak here of the deliberate western misplanning of African social and economic development though there is plenty of this. Note 2) What I refer to here is the self-misunderstanding of western philosophy, that western philosophers have grossly misunderstood both their societies and their own place in the world. Since all the social sciences and humanities draw deeply upon philosophy this self-misunderstanding infects them and via them the whole of western culture. If we are to solve our problems we must then create a *rupture* with their theories and maintain a critical distance from all future western theories.

Let me now explain more fully and precisely what I mean by the "Self-misunderstanding of western philosophy. By the phrase 'western philosophy' I refer to the post-Cartesian tradition and expressly exclude the Greeks.

In western philosophy the central problematic has been the cluster of moral and political issues around individualist society which was seen not only as a good thing but also as a precursor and precondition of even better things. Individualist society was said to be the product of men acting more under the light of reason than that of archaic and blind tradition. Post-renaissance man was scientific and inquisitive and it was this spirit which was the cause of the rapid social changes and the greater freedom possible in liberal society. As long as ideas and labour could be subjected to the free-market mechanism then the most efficient thinkers and businessmen would produce the best possible products. It was then incumbent upon all progressive men of goodwill to oppose all institutions, customs and habits of mind that

restricted the free exchange of ideas or labour.

Man's great hope was to be in science, the harbinger of prosperity for all mankind. Natural science had already made great strides in the control and manipulation of nature to man's desires. If the scientific spirit could be extended to other areas of human endeavour similar Newtonian revolutions could be expected there, with all the consequent benefits or the extension of the understanding. This scientific spirit was seen as an intrinsically positive moral value, scientific rigour was part of the moral rigour that was the sign of the good man. Progress was seen as the product of moral enlightenment, and for this reason moral philosophy became a strategic exercise: increase moral enlightenment and one increases the rate of progress.

But all this rested upon a fundamental misconception of the nature and cause of western social and economic progress in the 16-18th centuries. Two countries in the 16- 17th centuries showed rapid progress: England and Holland. Holland's progress was due in large part to her colonization of the East Indies and the surplus extracted from these countries and, one need only remember England's role in South America and her gradual neo-colonization of Portugal to see the parallel there. The economic structure of "progressive" Europe will be seen to have its feet set in the Third World from where 'prosperity' will be sucked up into the insatiable lap of incipiently capitalist Europe.

Certain qualifications need to be made here. I am *not* arguing that the prosperity of Europe was simply and directly drawn from the Third World as in an accounts ledger. Rather two things should be suggested by the above: firstly, the amount of damage done need bear no relation to the direct benefits accrued to the West. Secondly, the introduction of this external surplus can have a multiplier effect on the rate of technological change. So the direct benefits of colonization may be very small compared to the indirect results. Equally, the retrogressive effects of malstructured economies, the socially disastrous consequences of the establishment of plantation systems of production, (Note 6) and the lasting stagnation (currently concealed behind the facade or the *modernization of poverty*) due to outward directed growth can be quite incommensurable with the direct benefit received by Europe.

One question needs to be raised now: what made it possible for Europe to terrorize the rest of the world? The whole answer to this question will have interesting consequences, but here we will restrict ourselves to only a major part of the answer. A central role was played not by the means of production but the means of destruction, the technology of murder. It is the existence of fire-arms and the West's monopoly which predominantly accounts for Europe's ability to terrorize the rest of the world. When Africans possessed equal quantities and quality of arms, the onward march of European expansion meets decisive defeat as at Adowa. The same phenomena is repeated by the victory of the Vietnamese, aided by Russian and Chinese technology, against a murderous American imperialism.

We can now see that while western philosophers saw the progressive liberalization or their societies as the product of moral enlightenment the agents of this liberalization were engaging in the wholesale slaughter of populations, establishing completely arbitrary totalitarian despotisms and effecting the most violent attempt in history, fortunately unsuccessful, at the *domestication of man*. 'Enlightenment' was no sooner born in Europe than it was buried in the Third World.

With this picture of the moral genesis of progress and the historical coincidence of

continuous economic advance in Europe, western philosophers gave birth to the illusion that moral progress implies social progress and the path of both is indefinitely continuous.

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One unexpected consequence of this illusion was/is western racism. If moral enlightenment generates social progress, then the cause of the 'backwardness' of many Third World countries (Note 7) must be the *moral depravity* of these people. (Note 8) Here we see the enlightenment sources of western racism. (Note 9) Both conservative and radical philosophies of contemporary Europe draw some inspiration from the enlightenment and this to some extent accounts for the racism that permeates both sides.

It is a common dogma among left-wing enthusiasts that racism is the product of *capitalism* and that under socialism, racism, like the state, will wither away. Now I need not even discuss the racial situation in Russia or Cuba, but only point out that Marx and Engels were thorough going racists.

Describing the black people of Algeria, Marx writes:

'Out of all the inhabitants, *it is most likely the Moors who least deserve any respect. As city-dwellers they are more inclined to luxury than the Arabs and the Kabyles and, on account of the constant oppression of the Turkish governors, they are a timid race which has, notwithstanding, preserved their cruel and vindictive character while being of a very low moral level.*' (Note 10)

Engels describes the brutal French victory in Algeria as progressive:

'The conquest of Algeria is an important and *fortunate fact* of the *progress of civilization* .. .And after all, the modern bourgeois, with civilization, industry, order, and at least relative enlightenment following him, is preferable to the feudal lord or to the marauding robber with the barbarian state of society to which they belong.' (Note 11)

Engels on the American imperialist war against Mexico wrote:

'Is it a misfortune that the wonderful California was wrested from the *lazy Mexican, who did not know what to do with it?*' (Note 12)

Engels even claimed that 'Forms of thought (are) also partly inherited by development (self-evidence, for instance, of mathematical axioms for Europeans, certainly not for Bushmen and Australian Negroes).' (Note 13)

Both Marx and Engels believed in the civilizing mission of imperialism.

Finally, Marx's daughter Laura married the light skinned Black Cuban socialist, Paul Lafargue, Marx called him 'the bastard' and twice in a letter dated September 5, 1866, refers to his son-in-law as 'the nigger boy'. (Note 14)

I believe enough has been said to establish the profound Eurocentrism of Marx and Engels, their thoroughly racist attitudes to non-whites and their strongly favourable attitude to European imperialism. Racism it can be seen permeates the whole of western culture.

One of the major points of this paper is that much of western racism can be shown to support and to be supported by a central concept in contemporary western thought: the idea of evolution. The idea of evolution is a fundamental concept of modern biology, of history, of contemporary anthropological and social theories and is also part of many different technical discourses.

It so happens that the intelligibility of this concept can be seriously questioned. The idea of evolution can be seen to involve two essentially different ideas: that of hierarchy and that of a single uniform principle of transformation. Given a random collection of phenomena the way in which the concept of 'evolution' is applied to them so as to *order* them is as follows. First of all a conceptual stratification must be established according to certain criteria e.g. social 'complexity', geological time, etc; then the phenomena must be allotted their place within this hierarchy, and finally a single universal principle of transformation must be asserted that will show how phenomena at one level of the hierarchy can reach a higher level. History is introduced into this essentially timeless model only indirectly. The principle of transformation may be said to involve time, that is to say transformations can only take place over periods of time. We now have the evolutionary framework that is the key paradigm of contemporary western thought.

I must now present what I believe to be decisive objections to the idea of evolution as currently used or implied in western thought. The kernel of my objection is that while it is often claimed that the idea of 'evolution' is used to organize the phenomena at hand, the idea in fact *legislates* to the phenomena at hand, and legislates in a totally unacceptable manner. Let me elaborate upon this.

There are certain restrictions on the applicability of the idea of 'evolution', and these are essential to its intelligibility. For example, in the idea of evolution the categories of stratification cannot themselves change over time. What it is to be a man, dog or fish does not change over time. Species evolve into men, dog or fish, but manhood, doghood, or fishhood do not themselves change over time or evolve. The hierarchies of evolution are themselves non evolutionary. But what is to be made of the status of these timeless categories - one can adopt a nominalist reduction and say that there is no such thing as doghood but only particular dogs. But if this were so there would be no guarantee that dogs should continue to have anything in common, and all classification collapses. Or one can assert that these categories have a firmer significance but then there is the problem of justifying their timeless nature.

Another restriction is that the principle of transformation must be unidirectional. Phenomena which have evolved up the hierarchy cannot evolve down again. If this were tolerable it would not be possible to tell of any two similar phenomena whether they had both evolved 'up' to where they were now or whether one had evolved 'down' having been '*up*'. *If one considers lateral evolution which also is not intelligible within the idea of 'evolution' one finds that were it tolerated it would have as a consequence that for any two similar phenomena it would be impossible to tell whether one had evolved from a fish into a dog and the other from a bird into a dog.*

Not only must the principle of transformation be unidirectional it must also be unique and universal. The principle of transformation cannot itself be subject to changes. If this were tolerated it would be impossible to infer the process how a certain phenomenon made its way up the hierarchy. If the principle of transformation differed for one species over time or at any one time was different for different species it would not be possible to establish any stable hierarchy. The categories may remain but since each phenomenon would take its own way..... the hierarchical order would collapse. Equally, since naturalistic explanation demands that phenomena be subject to a universal law the varieties of transformation would render themselves derivative of some other law and thus render the idea of evolution only a partial organizing principle.

In each of these cases neglect of these restrictions would either render the idea of evolution unintelligible or so seriously impair it that it would be useless as an organizing principal idea. My objection can be put this way: there is nothing to show *a priori* that whatever phenomenon is being considered should not as an objective fact defy the rules of the idea of evolution and evolve laterally, non unidirectionally etc. That they do not and shall not is a dogma and assumption merely of the idea of evolution.

Now it may be said that *it so happens* that the biological phenomena coincide with the schema of the idea of evolution, and that such is the luck of evolutionary biology. Let us look at another area. If we consider the application the idea of evolution to societies these essential restrictions to the principle of the idea can be clearly seen to make nonsense of the phenomena. There is no unidirectional pattern of social transformation in history. Societies progress, stagnate and regress. Two different societies may arrive at the same category via radically different paths, and a society in a category at one level of the hierarchy may change its category without altering its level upon the hierarchy. For example, an underdeveloped society may tum socialist from being neo-capitalist while remaining for some time equally underdeveloped. Certainly the kinds of hierarchy that exist between societies change over time, just as the factor, e.g. war, piracy, technology, colonial domination etc, causing the most 'transformation' in society. It *is* patently clear that the evolutionary scheme does not accord with the objective facts of social transformations in history.

In fact, even with the assumption of the miraculous coincidence of fact and idea, the application of the evolutionary schema in biology is not as straightforward as it may seem. Given the naturalistic principle of transformation adopted in evolutionary biology and its rejection of Lamarckian teleologies, one is confronted with the fact that since it is natural selection in co-operation with the ecology that determines the pattern of evolution, there is no reason why ecological changes should not take place that favour 'regressive' mutations so that the unacceptable regressive evolution can begin. It may be claimed that such ecological changes have not taken place, but this would not show that they could not, now or in the future and therefore it would be unjustified of biologists to rule it out by *fiat*. Once we take the role of ecology in natural selection seriously we realize that evolutionary schemas assume that all ecological changes will be *progressive*. The slogan 'the survival of the fittest' assumes that what survives will always be the fittest in some non-tautological sense. This is merely a pious hope with ideological motivation but no rational justification. (Note 15)

As a consequence all of these evolutionary schemas can be seen to lead to considerable distortions of fact and misconstrual of significances. It is Marx's allegiance to the idea of evolution that leads him to drift to the formulation of a single universal principle of transformation: class-struggle.

But as we have seen at various times different factors transform society, sometimes the technology of destruction, sometimes the technology of production and different factors at other times.

Incidentally, exactly the same problems arise in linguistics whose structural paradigm is the idea of evolution with an ahistorical principle of transformation. In structural linguistics there are hierarchies and principles of transformation and the same objections to the model's assumption of timeless unchanging hierarchies, of single universal unidirectional principles of transformation arise there.

It should be clear that for anyone who does not wish to establish hierarchies, adoption of evolutionary schemas would involve acceptance of Trojan horses. Any use of evolutionary schemas in discussions of social transformation will inevitably establish hierarchies with a strong tendency towards racist conclusions. The subversive power of the idea of evolution can be seen in the way it misleads Cabral into accepting the Marxist rubbish about the progressive mission of imperialism (Note 16). Shall we here speak of the 'civilizing mission' of colonialism, its sister?.

Let us now consider the consequences of the idea of evolution for the self-misunderstanding of western philosophy. The hierarchical aspect of the idea led to the stratification of all human societies along a chain of being with Europe at the top, while the universal and unidirectional principle of transformation led to the assumption that all societies were going in the same direction through the same paths. If we now add to this model the consequences of the illusion that it is moral enlightenment which fuels social progress we have a picture of linear social evolution where each material advance is accompanied by a moral advance. Barbarism is not only a state of primitive social organization, it is also a state of moral darkness. Civilization is not only a state of complex social organization and industrial production it is also a state of extreme moral uprightness.

When this illusion is confronted with the rise of fascism and racism in Europe, western scholars would often claim that this was a reversion to barbarism, that it was alien to the true traditions of Europe. But more serious study of the phenomena reveal that racism and Nazism have firm and deep roots within western culture. One thoughtful western scholar comments that:

'Fascist' can no longer all be dismissed as psychopaths or the scum of society, and fascism cannot merely be seen as an appeal to man's animal nature. The history of fascism must be interlocked with the whole history of modern Europe -not treated on one side as an ulcerous growth or a temporary nightmare. Fascism is as much an organic part of modern Europe as liberalism or communism.'(Note 17)

In fact the era of Nazism was, as Césaire pointed out, the practice within Europe of the techniques of wholesale slaughter and arbitrary despotism that Europe practised in the Third World. But to western philosophy strenuously and dogmatically attaching itself to its old illusion, fascism was due to the breakdown of reason. A firm attachment to the standards of 'reason' would prevent any recurrence of such horror.

When this tissue of falsehoods, illusions and self serving half-truths is drawn upon to formulate programmes for development in the Third World the net effect is the production of misinformed and self-defeating plans. The broad programme is as follows: Africa needs to develop and to develop means to move up the stable hierarchy of economic stages closer to the level where Europe is now. Since there is only one principle of transformation Africa will have to follow in the foot steps of the West. By understanding how the west progressed economically we can understand how Africa, if it is fortunate, will be able to develop.

As for the three problems of nationalism, alienation and the crisis of ideology, the solutions which are suggested are that it is only by developing nation-states more fully that we can reach a stage where we, like Europe, can begin to merge them. Meanwhile we must

tolerate the maleffects of nationalism, attempting to moderate them where possible. Alienation and anomie are the inevitable products of rapid urbanization and characterize more or less all industrial societies. The development of collective forms of social solidarity, wherever this is not incompatible with liberal freedoms may help, but by and large these are inescapable problems. As for the so-called 'crisis of ideology,' there is no such thing. The programmatic solution to Africa's problems is to adopt a liberal utilitarian and technocratic manner of government and avoid all general and abstract solutions; in a phrase, adopt social engineering.

This is sheer rubbish. Societies can transform themselves in many different ways and there is no need to rehearse the previous stages of other countries. Nor are all societies moving in the same direction. There is no need for Africa to seek to imitate the West with its social and political cancers. We must rely on our own creativity.

As for the three major problems of our time let me sketch some programmatic solutions. Nationalism should be undermined before it becomes uncontrollable. The way this can be done is by establishing explicit economic interdependencies between different regions and different countries, and by taking the unequal development of regions and countries as a very serious *political* threat to African unity. Alienation can be dynamically eliminated by realizing that in formulating plans for our future development we should make sure that our societies remain ones worth living in. We should realize that technocratic manipulation, authoritarian political structures and the failure to include the initiative of the people in our plans can only be utterly and tragically self defeating. If we bear in mind that we are not trying to imitate the west, that we should be trying to evolve a new kind of society altogether, these points should never wander far from our minds.

All the above is particularly relevant to the problem of the crisis of ideology. I hope to have shown in the major part of this paper the central irrelevance of Western theories that are permeated with the idea of evolution. All such Western theories have a tendency to racist stratification, and to a radical distortion of the phenomena. It ought also to be added that Western socialism has died—all that remains is the hollow shell of a once living institution. Western socialism is no longer even a partially progressive or liberating force on the world scale, and contents itself with the continuous rehearsal of old refrains that have by sheer repetition lost most of their meaning. Orthodox western socialism is irrelevant to Africa, as Cabral saw when he pointed out that the slogan 'the land to those who work it' is pointless in a society where land is plentiful and colonialism operates through the mechanisms of unequal exchange.

In the years ahead we need to think *creatively*, and this will be impossible if we have a disproportionate and uncritical 'respect' for mistaken western theories and if our scholars worship at the feet of third-rate western intellectuals for their crumbs of enlightenment. (Note 18)

My proposed solution to the problem of the crisis of ideology is a two-fold strategy. The first part of the solution is to take very seriously the great tradition that encompasses Blyden, Douglass, Horton, Garvey, DuBois, Padmore, Cesaire, Nkrumah and Fanon. We must as a second part continue their tradition, seeking within our own cultures for the framework of future societies, keeping a permanent critical distance from western ideas. (Note 19)

Fanon expressed this in these words:

So, comrades, let us not pay tribute to Europe by creating states, institutions and societies which draw their inspiration from her. Humanity is waiting for something other from us than such an imitation, which would be almost an obscene caricature. (Note 20)

This is a point that cannot be overstressed: we have not come onto the 'world-stage' at the last scene, it is not our job as smiling menials to merely apply the ideas originated and finalized within the West. Our historical mission, in this present context, is to create a rupture in the history of civilizations, to subject *human* history to a devastating critique, to locate the matrices of a tricontinental consciousness and through that pursue the creation of a new conception of Man hitherto unconceived, perhaps previously *inconceivable*, that will embody the fulfilment of man's true aspirations.

It should be clear that I do not support nor want to be called a socialist. (Note 21) If there must be labels, I prefer 'Fanonist.' That being so, let me end with a quotation from this great man:

'... If we wish to reply to the expectations of the people of Europe, it is no good sending them back a reflection, even an ideal reflection, of their society and their thought, with which from time to time they feel immeasurably sickened.

'For Europe, for ourselves and for humanity, comrades, we must turn over a new leaf, we must work out new concepts, and try to set afoot a new man.' (Note 22)

EndNotes:

- 1.. B. D. G. Folson (Folson, 1973) completely confuses issues in his example of an amateur analysis. of the word 'ideology.' It would be profitless to catalogue his errors. but some comments are relevant here. He writes:

'If every political party had an ideology it would be relatively easy to point to it, to get hold of it, to read it...'

This is quite mistaken. Ideologies need not be explicit. and often it takes very subtle investigation to reveal them, as in the case of the ideological content of evolutionary biology and the contemporary natural sciences as analysed by Dr Robert Young. Folson's arguments are false when not trivial. To see African politics simply in terms of individuals seeking personal power is the limit of bankruptcy in political analysis. He complains about the ambiguities in the use of 'ideology' but all central terms of discourse are continuously being modified by historical usage. Compare the even more 'fatal' ambiguities in the usage of 'Christianity' with that of 'ideology' and one sees no significant difference, and besides who is to decide what is a misuse of terms'?

Folson's article is just an example of an African scholar proudly rehearsing the cliches of contemporary western social science as if they were his own 'discoveries', stalely repeating that old reactionary 'liberal' war-horse: the accusation of authoritarianism to socialism, mingling this with his own shameless intellectual arrogance, 'there just are not enough . educated people around.' and contributing exactly nothing to the deepening of our political understanding.

Since there is no patent on words. and since, *pace* Folson. western sociologists very often 'misuse' words with 'fatal' ambiguity too. cf. 'functional.' 'scientific', 'empirical.' I will here use the word 'ideology' as almost every body else will understand what I mean.
2. See S Amin (Amin, 1973) , Also cf.

'A lot of criticism of foreign aid is because the critic thought the objective was to get economic growth, and this was not the objective at all' D. A. Fitzgerald. Dept. of State, 1948-61, quoted in (Africa Research Group, 1970)·International Dependency In The 1970.
3. In a public lecture in London in 1973, 'Frantz Fanon: The Reconstruction of Black Consciousness.' I traced the development of this intellectual tradition. An expanded version will be published in the near future.
 4. cf: Nixon's America.
 - 5 See Fred. J. Cook "The Corrupted Land' (Cook, n.d.)'
 6. See C. L. Beckford (Beckford, 1972)
 7. But bear in mind that 'As late as the early seventeenth century India was more economically advanced than Europe,' K. Griffin (Griffin, 1969)
 8. Thus the civilizing mission and the need to 'enlighten' 'primitive' peoples of all sorts.
 9. Need I add that I am not attempting to give the entire account of western racism.
 10. 'Textes sur le colonialisme' Moscow. n.d. p. 187-8, quoted in a brilliant essay by Carlos Moore (Moore, 1972)' My italics.
 11. quoted Carlos Moore op. cit. p. 18.
 12. ibid p. 20
 13. F. Engels (Engels, 1969) p. 399.
 14. For further information Carlos Moore's article is strongly recommended. Racism

permeated all branches of the European Left then (e.g. the Webbs were pro-imperialists) and, not surprisingly, now.

15. In war it is the 'unfit' who survive best.
16. A. Cabral (Cabral, 1969), p. 80. Cabral says that imperialism failed in its 'progressive' mission, but *not* that it had no such mission. Cabral was nevertheless perceptive enough to abandon the timeless hierarchies of Marxism (the concept of class) 'the sociological phenomenon 'class' is created and develops.. .. (p. 75)
17. H. R. Kedward. (Kedward, 1971) p. 5. Another scholar M. D. Biddis writes:
'It could be argued . . . that such features of racism as its authoritarianism, its restrictive conception of liberty and its tendency to deny common humanity have played a most considerable role in the European tradition and that therefore racism should be seen not as something separate from the main strand but as an essential element.'
18. I do *not* claim that there is nothing in western philosophy worth considering.
19. Soyinka in 'The Man Died' (Soyinka, 1972) drifts towards a Kantianism that almost betrays the deeper insights into our moral condition he derived from Yoruba tragedy. Kant in trying to establish the certainty of our moral notions succeeds only in emptying them of all content. This same Kant who insists upon the *universality* of right, is the same Kant who denies all civic rights to the workers and anyone 'below' the bourgeoisie. See P. Nizan (Paul Nizan, 1972) p. 143. The tragic nature of man's predicament permeates into the sanctuaries of knowledge and morality. For more on my concept of tragic epistemology and for a more sustained analysis of 'the self-misunderstanding of western philosophy' see the first issue of the forthcoming 'African Journal Of Science, Technology and Society.'
20. F. Fanon (Fanon, 1967)
21. Often Africans label themselves 'socialist' so as to locate themselves upon an essentially meaningless spectrum. By 'Socialism' I mean orthodox western socialism.
22. Fanon op. cit. p. 255

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